The Ultimate History of Iraqi insurgency - American History Information Guide and Reference

In May of 2003, after the Iraqi conventional forces had been defeated, the U.S military noticed a gradually increasing flurry of attacks on U.S troops in various regions of the so-called "Sunni Triangle," especially in Baghdad and in the regions around Fallujah and Tikrit. These consisted of small groups of suspected guerrillas firing assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades at U.S patrols and convoys in attacks that were often poorly planned and demonstrated poor marksmanship and training. In many cases the insurgents were killed in the return fire. The attacks were blamed by the U.S military on remnants of the Ba'ath Party and the Fedayeen Saddam militia.

Coalition response and counterinsurgency (June-September 2003)

In response, on June 9, the U.S military launched Operation Peninsula Sweep , in which 2,000 soldiers from Task Force Iron Horse swept through the Tigris River peninsula of Thuluiya in the Sunni Triangle, detaining 397 Iraqis. Almost all of the detainees were later released, and the operation failed to stem the tide of the tide of the assaults. A series of similar operations were launched throughout the summer in the Sunni Triangle, such as Operation Sidewinder , Operation Soda Mountain, and Operation Ivy Serpent . One, known as Operation Desert Scorpion, succeeded in destroying an encampment of over 70 foreign fighters, possibly linked to the Fedayeen Saddam, near the Syrian border town of Rawa.

However, these initial counterinsurgency efforts are now considered a failure. The sweeps failed to stem the tide of the attacks, which during the summer of 2003 numbered about a dozen a day and resulted in, on average, 1 U.S soldier killed and 7 more wounded every day. The guerillas began adopting new and more complex tactics, such as the planting of IED’s, the use of mortars, and better-planned ambushes. Although some humanitarian operations were included in what was intended to be a “carrot and stick” strategy, the cordon and search operations are widely criticized for being far to blunt and not carefully targeted. The large numbers of innocent Iraqis detained during the raids, the removal of palm trees and other foliage to deprive guerillas of cover for ambushes (and which represented the livelihoods of many farmers) and the failure to restore basic services such as water and electricity to pre-war levels began generating a nationalist resistance amongst the Sunnis (in addition to holdouts from Saddam’s regime), and began resulting in the disillusionment of an Iraqi populace that was initially largely grateful. In addition, as the summer neared its end, a series of suicide bombings began that suggested an increasing Islamist terrorist threat, largely believed to be composed of foreign fighters.

An effort began in August by the coalition to increase human intelligence gathering in order to more carefully target operations. The effort did eventually began to reap limited results in the north-central region of the country (which includes Tikrit and up to the southern borders of Mosul and Kirkuk), as informants guided troops over the next six months to hideouts and weapons caches primarily belonging to the Fedayeen and the remaining Ba’athist resistance. However, most of the Sunni regions saw the military situation gradually worsen for the U.S as a stubborn nationalist resistance began to take hold.

Ramadan Offensive (October-November 2003)

In October of 2003, the intense and pace of insurgent attacks began to noticeably increase. Finally, at the end of October, a series of four simultaneous suicide car bomb attacks on the Iraqi police and the International Red Cross, quickly followed by a sharp surge in guerilla attacks, ushered an insurgent effort that was termed the “Ramadan Offensive,” as it coincided with the beginning of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Attacks that were increased to nearly 50 a day, along with a series of helicopter downings, resulted in a U.S death toll of 82 for the month of November with 337 wounded in action.

Operation Iron Hammer (November-December 2003)

In response, the coalition unleashed its counteroffensive known as Operation Iron Hammer in the second week of November. Operation Iron Hammer brought back the use of U.S air power for the first time since the end of the war, with suspected ambush sites and mortar launching positions struck from the air and with artillery fire. Surveillance of major routes, patrols, and raids on suspected insurgents were stepped up. In addition, two villages, including Saddam’s birthplace of al-Auja and the small town of Abu Hishma were wrapped in barbed wire and carefully monitored. Following Operation Iron Hammer, the number of insurgent attacks dropped to an average of 18 a day. In the wave of intelligence information fueling the raids on remaining Ba’ath Party members connected to insurgency, Saddam Hussein himself was captured on a farm near Tikrit on December 12, 2003. This apparent renewed success led many to the conclusion the U.S had turned the corner and was prevailing in the fight against the insurgency.

Early 2004 (January-March 2004)

The period from December of 2003 to March 2004 marked a relative lull. It is believed that although some real damage was done to the underground insurgency, especially to the Saddam Hussein loyalists that had not yet given up the fight, this was mainly a period of reorganization during which new U.S tactics were studied and a renewed offensive planned. Although the guerilla attacks were less intense, the terrorist offensive, possibly connected to the followers of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, only increased. Hundreds of Iraqi civilians and police were killed over this period in a series of massive bombings. The bombings indicated that as the relevance of Saddam Hussein and his followers was diminishing, radical Islamists, both foreign and Iraqi, were stepping to the fore to fill the vacuum. A Sunni insurgency, with deep roots and with nationalist and Islamist motivations, was becoming clearer.

Spring 2004 Uprising (March-June 2004)

However, the insurgency would not for long be confined to the Sunni regions of Iraq. Over this period, Shiite dissatisfaction with the occupation, especially among the urban poor, had been gradually increasing for some of the same reasons it had been among the Sunnis: the perception that the coalition had failed to deliver on its promises and a nationalist dissatisfaction with foreign occupation. Young men without jobs or prospects and who had lost faith with the coalition began to become drawn to Shiite religious radicalism, especially of the brand advocated by the cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. Sadr distinguished family background, and his fiery anti-occupation rhetoric and calls for the implementation of Islamic law, caused him to emerge as the leader of this portion of Iraqi Shiite society. In June of 2003, after being rejected from a spot on the Iraqi Governing Council, he had created a militia known as the Mahdi Army, whose mission he said was to help keep order and cleanse Iraq of “evil.” Since that point, the U.S had regarded him as a threat, but was divided on whether or not to proceed with a crackdown. Eventually, as Sadr’s rhetoric heated and his militia paraded through Sadr City in what seemed like a challenge to the United States, they decided to begin to squeeze his movement. On March 29, they moved to close Sadr’s newspaper known as “al-Hawza” and arrested one of his aides on murder charges. That, combined with his steadily decreasing political prospects, pushed Sadr to decide for armed revolt.

On April 4, the Mahdi Army was directed to begin launching attacks on coalition targets and to seize control from Iraqi security forces. The Mahdi Army, which by then numbered from 3,000 to 10,000 men, organized quickly escalating violent riots and then a coordinated assault, surprising coalition and Iraqi forces and seizing control of Najaf, Kufa, al-Kut, and parts of Baghdad and southern cities like Nasiriyah, Amarah, and Basra. A widespread collapse of the Iraqi security forces ensued, with most deserting or defecting to the rebels rather than fighting. Soon, the southern and central portions of Iraq were beginning to erupt in urban guerilla combat as U.S forces attempted to keep control and prepared for a counteroffensive.

At the same time, the Sunni insurgency was rapidly worsening. On March 31, 2004, four private military contractors working for the U.S military were killed and subsequently mutilated by insurgents and a crowd of residents in the city of Fallujah, long a particularly troublesome center of Sunni resistance to the U.S presence. On the same day, 4 U.S soldiers were killed by a large IED on a road a few miles outside of the city. The attacks took place as the Marines were taking over responsibility for al-Anbar province, in which Fallujah is located, from the U.S Army. The intended Marine strategy of patrols, less aggressive raids, humanitarian aid, and close cooperation with local leaders was quickly suspended and the U.S decided that it was time for a major assault to clear the city of insurgents. On April 4, U.S and Iraqi forces launched Operation Vigilante Resolve to retake the city, which had clearly fallen completely into rebel hands. They met very stiff and well-organized resistance from the guerillas. The insurgent force defending Fallujah was believed to number over 2,000 men, divided into platoon-sized units. The guerillas used sophisticated tactics not seen before in the Iraq war, using standard infantry tactics such as indirect fire support, cover fire, and phased withdrawal. It was noted to resemble a Soviet-style “defense-in-depth” strategy, suggesting guidance from former members of the Iraqi Army rather than foreign jihadis who would more likely used tactics reminiscent of the mujahideen in Afghanistan. After three days of fighting with the U.S Marines, the insurgents still held three-quarters of the city.

Cases of widespread reach and planning, suggesting national insurgent coordination, were noted. Hundreds of insurgents cut the road between Fallujah and Baghdad to the east, while west of Fallujah in Ramadi, over 150 insurgents launched an offensive against U.S Marine positions. A similar attack followed, conducted by about 150 insurgents, against U.S Marines near the Syrian border in al-Qaim . The assaults were beaten back, but the U.S toll from the combined attacks numbered in the dozens.

In Fallujah, after a series of attempted truces, the U.S Marines began a pullback on April 30. The U.S decided that pushing forward with an offensive to crush the insurgents would likely result in the destruction of Fallujah and unacceptable American and civilian casualties. Control of the city was left to the “Fallujah Brigade ,” drawn from former members of the Iraqi Army and even from the insurgents themselves. As time went on, however, it became clear that the guerillas essentially had maintained control over the city, with Islamic law enforced by Islamist groups and the Fallujah Brigade unwilling to confront the guerillas and confined to their barracks. Eventually, the Fallujah Brigade disintegrated, with all signs of government authority gone. By the end of the spring uprising, the cities of Fallujah, Samarra, Baquba, and Ramadi had been left under guerilla control with American patrols in the cities ceased. U.S forces launched only occasional armored forays into Samarra and Baquba, while about half a dozen small forts were maintained by the U.S Marines in Ramadi, with the surrounding territory in the city controlled by rebels. American ground forces remained outside of Fallujah, though regular air strikes were conducted on alleged safehouses of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's followers in the city. With the battle for Fallujah over, the Sunni insurgency outside these cities against U.S forces continued with the guerillas resuming their tactics of using IED’s and mortars to attack U.S forces indirectly and for the most part avoiding direct combat.

Meanwhile, the fighting continued in the Shiite south. Over the next three months, over 1,500 Mahdi Army militiamen, several hundred civilians, and dozens of coalition soldiers were killed as the U.S gradually took back the southern cities. On June 6, a truce was reached, temporarily ending the fighting. The U.S declared that the Mahdi Army had been militarily defeated when Brigadier General Mark Hertling , a top US commander in charge of Najaf, Iraq, stated "The Moqtada militia is militarily defeated. We have killed scores of them over the last few weeks, and that is in Najaf alone. [...] The militia have been defeated, or have left..." Sadr remained in control of parts of Najaf and Sadr City, while the U.S continued to patrol in the south outside those areas.

Transfer of sovereignty (June-July 2004)

On June 28, 2004, the occupation was formally ended by the coalition, which transferred power to a new Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. With the situation in the south seemingly settled and the transfer of power, many hoped that the steam would be taken out of the ongoing Sunni insurgency. Although many Iraqis were optimistic about the government, militants saw it as little more than an American puppet and continued the fight unabated. On July 18, guerillas offered a $285,000 reward for Allawi’s assassination.

Battle for Najaf and the truce agreement (August 2004)

Soon, however, the peace in the south would once again be broken. The U.S Marines, having taken control from the U.S Army of the area around Najaf, began to adopt a more aggressive posture with the Mahdi Army and began patrolling zones previously considered off-limits. Soon, the Mahdi Army declared that the truce had been broken and militiamen launched an assault on a police station. U.S forces responded, and in the first week of August, a prolonged conflict broke out in Najaf (one of the holiest cities in Shi'ite Islam) over control of the Imam Ali shrine, a often thought of as the holiest Shi'ite Muslim shrine in Iraq. Heavy combat ensued in the Old City of Najaf around the shrine and in the Wadi al-Salam (Valley of Peace) cemetery, one of the largest cemeteries in the world. The terrain of the cemetery, densely packed with above-ground mausoleums and underground caves, favored the urban guerilla warfare conducted by Sadr's militia. It was described by U.S soldiers as "jungle warfare without the jungle." Nevertheless, U.S forces continued a steady advance and inflicted heavy casualties on Sadr's forces.

Eventually, after three weeks of fighting, Sadr's forces had been reduced from 2,000 spread out throughout the city and the cemetery to only a few hundred holding out within the shrine itself. Although much of the fighting was conducted by US forces, it was anticipated that only Iraqi forces would enter the shrine. Negotiations with radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, a leading Shi'ite cleric in Iraq and leader of the Mahdi Army defending the shrine, were attempted but did not end the standoff. On August 25, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, aged 73, arrived in Iraq and began traveling towards Najaf to stop the bloodshed.

By the next day, an agreement brokered by Sistani seemed to come into force. Although the exact terms of the agreement were not clear, it required the Mahdi militia to disarm and vacate Najaf and for U.S. troops to withdraw from the city; these forces were to be replaced by interim government security forces. An interim government spokesman said al-Sadr's supporters could join the political process and al-Sadr may remain free. These requirements are essentially the same as those under the truce agreed on in June. According to the agreement, Ayatollah Sistani would also take over responsibility for the Imam Ali shrine; fighters would leave the shrine, and visitors will be allowed in; additionally, the Iraqi interim government would agree to repair damage to buildings caused by the fighting. This resolution occurred two days before the one year anniversary of the assassination of Sayed Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, a prominent Shi'ite cleric from Najaf.

Aftermath of the truce and renewed fighting in Baghdad (September 2004)

While for the most part both the Mahdi Army and U.S forces observed the truce by withdrawing from Najaf and returning control to the Iraqi government, many of the remnants of Sadr's militia in Najaf kept their weapons and moved north into Sadr City in order to regroup. Negotiations involving the U.S and local leaders in Sadr City for the disarmament of the local guerillas and the veterans of the fighting in Najaf had broken down by early September. The Mahdi Army, which may not have been acting under Mr. Sadr's orders, refused any agreement that allowed U.S patrolling Sadr City or which involved the handing in of their weapons. As a result, renewed heavy fighting began on September 6 between U.S forces and Shiite militiamen in Sadr City. The first few days of fighting killed at least 2 U.S soldiers and dozens of Iraqis, both civilians and fighters. In combination with a suicide bombing that killed 7 U.S Marines and 3 Iraqi soldiers nine miles north of Fallujah, as well as an increase in IED attacks by Sunni insurgents in Baghdad, the total U.S death toll for the Iraq war passed 1,000 on September 7, 2004.

Coalition counteroffensive begins (September-November 2004)

With the violent threat from Sadr's forces eliminated throughout most of Iraq, coaliton forces and the Iraqi government began turning their attention towards bringing under control the numerous Sunni guerilla safe-havens that remained from the spring uprising. Officials from the U.S-led coalition and Allawi's government began drawing up plans to retake guerilla strongholds in advance of the parliamentary elections planned for January 2005 in Iraq. Many observers and coalition officals feared that by leaving swaths of territory under guerilla control (and the populations living in those areas therefore unable to vote), the legitmacy of the elections would be compromised. The cities under the least firm guerilla control would be taken first, with Fallujah, the heart of the insurgency, waiting until after the U.S presidential election.

The first of these offensives began on September 1, 2004, when U.S and Iraqi forces besieged the northern Turkmen city of Tal Afar , located west of Mosul. U.S forces said that the town was being used as a transit point for the entry of foreign guerillas and weapons from nearby Syria. After a 12-day siege, the city was stormed and retaken by U.S and Iraqi troops in September 12. 58 people were reported killed in the fighting.

The next stage of the offensive began on September 30, when 3,000 soldiers from the U.S Army 1st Infantry Division and 2,000 Iraqi troops launched a surprise attack on guerilla-controlled Samarra. The insurgent hold on the city proved to be tenuous, and the rebel forces were quickly beaten back by U.S armor and air power. Rather than fighting, most of the guerillas either fled the city or melted into the population. The U.S estimated that 130 insurgents and 1 U.S soldier were killed, although residents reported that many civilians were among the dead. The operation was declared a success by the U.S military on October 4. U.S troops also reported have freedom of movement in Baquba, also north of Baghdad, though neither city was pacified.

The next phase began soon afterwards, on October 5, when 3,000 coalition and Iraqi troops began a sweep against Sunni insurgents through northern Babil province just south of Baghdad, an area also known as the "Triangle of Death" for the amount of hostage-taking and guerilla violence in the area. Coalition forces moved west from their forward operating bases across the Euphrates River, securing a key bridge and conducting house-to-house searches. Once again, the insurgents, and surprisingly much of the civilian population, melted away before the offensive rather than fighting, taking shelter in nearby areas. Small-scale rebel harassment was reported, but not major fighting. As a result, the operation saw little success in netting rebel fighters.

At the same time, negotiations involving the Iraqi interim government, tribal leaders, and Mahdi Army officials successfully brought a resolution to the fighting in Sadr City. A weapons handover was announced, and some weapons trickled into the Iraqi police from Shiite rebels. Although the Mahdi Army retained some of its weapons stockpiles, it was no longer an active participant in the violent Iraqi revolt. Sadr repeatedly signalled a desire to participate in the elections, though he did not compromise his strong anti-occupation stance.

This left the heart of the Sunni insurgency, Fallujah, bracing for an attack. Large numbers of U.S Army troops and Marines began massing in bases ringing the city, and most of the civilian population fled. To support the buildup, British forces deployed the Black Watch regiment, composed of 850 men, from Basra to the "triangle of death" south of Baghdad in order to replace U.S troops heading for Fallujah. The decision proved controversial in Britain, especially after the regiment suffered casualties from dogged attacks involving suicide bombers and roadside bombs.

Battle for Fallujah and results (November 2004-January 2005)

The U.S and Iraqi buildup around Fallujah continued, and by the beginning of November and the time of the U.S presidential elections, over 10,000 U.S and 2,000 Iraqi troops surrounded the city. The Iraqi troops were drawn from what were considered the most capable segments of the U.S-trained Iraqi security forces and were mainly drawn from the Shiite regions of Iraq. The vast majority of the civilian population by that time had fled, although thousands remained (either because they lacked means of transportation or because they were guarding their property). Many guerillas also apparently slipped out among the fleeing civilians, leaving a force of 2,000 still remaining in the city out of what had grown to 5,000 (according to estimates).

Finally, on November 8, the assault on Fallujah began. A concentrated barrage of air strikes and artillery (possibly including white phosophorus rounds, and even certain chemical weapons, according to some reports) began pounding the city. Simultaneously, U.S and Iraqi forces began advancing, primarily from the north, and quickly securing the city's main hospital. Guerilla resistance was initially reported to be less than expected, partially due to U.S diversionary tactics and also because much of the insurgent force in Fallujah had fled.

By November 9, U.S units had penetrated into the heart of the city. By now, they were receiving stiff opposition from small groups of guerillas, employing hit-and-run tactics, and snipers. Booby traps, rigged to destroy homes U.S troops had entered, also were encountered, including some even attached to corpses. Within a week, 38 U.S troops had been killed and 275 wounded in the offensive. Insurgent losses during that same time period were believed to be much heavier, running into several hundred.

Gradually, U.S and Iraqi forces pushed the main insurgent force into the southwest of the city, carefully conducting house-to-house searches and securing areas of the city block by block. The U.S military adopted a "hammer and anvil" strategy, in which they hoped to methodicaly push the insurgents into the southwestern corner of the city and up against the open desert (where they would be without cover or concealment and open to a final rout by U.S firepower). Although they encountered great difficulties against the evasive guerilla bands, the majority of the insurgents in the city had been killed or captured by late November. Significant guerilla resistance, however, continued until January (much of it by insurgents operating out of pre-prepared hidden tunnels).

By the end of most of the fighting, over 50 U.S soldiers had been killed and several hundred wounded. As many as 2,000 insurgents may have been killed, according to U.S military estimates. Reports suggested a heavy toll among remaining civilians in the city as well. Most of the city suffered severe damage from the fighting by the battle's end. In the months to come, only a small fraction of refugees from the city would permanently return.

The attack on Fallujah had unintended consequences for much of the rest of Iraq. Insurgents fleeing Fallujah filtered into northern Babil province, Mosul in the north, and Baghdad itself. As a result, a sharp spike of violence was seen upon the attack's commencment, with mortar and IED attacks increasing in frequency and intensity. The campaign of suicide bombings and car bombings, mainly effecting Iraqi civilians, intensified to the worst point ever seen. The worst violence was seen in Mosul. Insurgents launched a massive offensive, seizing the western (Arab) half of the city and effectively destroying the police force at the same time the U.S launched its assault on Fallujah. On November 16, over 3,000 U.S troops and a similiar number of Iraqi troops launched a counteroffensive, dismantingly insurgents from strategic points but failing to break their hold on most of the city. Mosul, which a year earlier was relatively peaceful compared to much of Iraq, would be a scene of some of the heaviest sustained fighting for some time to come.

With the year's end, the U.S military reported that they had killed or captured at least 15,000 guerillas over the course of 2004, giving a new perspective on the intensity of the fighting during that period. 848 U.S soldiers were killed in 2004, and 9,034 were wounded in action. There are no exact figures, but thousands of Iraq security forces, as well as Iraqi civilians, were killed as well, both in terrorist attacks and from U.S aerial bombardment and accidental shootings.

Iraqi elections and aftermath (January-February 2005)

Although no major cities were now under the control of rebels, the spike of increased guerilla violence against U.S and Iraqi forces continued into January. The focus of attention was now on the impending elections set for January 31. Many rebels became intent on disrupting the elections, and conducted an intense campaign of assassinations and suicide bombings on Iraqis involved with them. 107 U.S soldiers were also killed in the month running up to the elections. By now, Iraqi police and security forces trained by the U.S seemed to be beginning to take a more prominent role in many towns and cities of Iraq, and were beginning to bear the brunt of the violence.

Sources

Categories: Iraqi insurgency | Rebellion

Your American History Reference Guide! - History of Iraqi insurgency

History of Iraqi insurgency

Insurgency begins (May-June 2003)